



**US Army Corps
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Development Center

The Army Environmental History Project

Interview with Susan Morrissey Livingstone, Assistant Secretary of the Army for Installations, Logistics and Environment

Transcript of an Oral History Recorded 14 April and 14 June 2005

Donita M. Moorhus

March 2007

Ryan R. Busby, Editor



Susan Livingstone, Assistant Secretary of the Army for Installations, Logistics and Environment, and LTG Henry Hatch, Chief of Engineers, at the 125th Annual Engineer Dinner, 27 February 1992.

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Abstract: Susan M. Livingstone served as Assistant Secretary of the Army for Installations, Logistics and Environment from 1989 to 1993, where she was instrumental in establishing the four pillars (Compliance, Conservation, Pollution Prevention, and Restoration) of the Army's very successful environmental program. She was actively engaged in cleanup of formerly used defense sites and installations slated for closure. She is a recipient of the Secretary of Defense Award for Outstanding Public Service, as well as the highest civilian awards from the Departments of the Army and Navy, the National Reconnaissance Office, and the Veterans Administration.

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Preface

This work was conducted for Headquarters, U.S. Army Corps of Engineers under Project RK01-62272089600, “Base Facility Environmental Quality,” Work Item 6HF9K5, “The Army Environmental History Project.” The technical monitor was John J. Fittipaldi, Army Environmental Policy Institute (OASA (I&E)).

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During the preparation of this monograph, Dr. Lucy A. Whalley was Chief, CN-C, and Dr. John T. Bandy was Chief, CN. The Technical Director of the Military Land Management technology domain was Dr. William D. Severinghaus. The Deputy Director of CERL was Dr. Kirankumar V. Topudurti, and the Director was Dr. Ilker R. Adiguzel.

COL Richard B. Jenkins was Commander and Executive Director of ERDC. Dr. James R. Houston was Director.

1 Introduction

Family and Educational Background

MOORHUS: I'd like you to start by giving some background, in terms of your growing up, your education, and your career before we get to the Army.

LIVINGSTONE: Well, I was a military brat. My father was career Air Force, and we were not stationed at all overseas, except for Hawaii, which was not a state at the time that I lived in it. My father retired, actually, the year and month I got married, so I spent my entire non-married life as an Air Force brat and traveling around with my parents and my brother from place to place, and it was a wonderful life, actually. Great experiences, and you meet a lot of wonderful people, but it's important to have a very stable and loving family environment to kind of hold that together.

I got married in August 1968, to a fellow [Neil C. Livingstone] from Montana, and I got married in Gibraltar, of all places, a British crown colony. I came back and stayed in Montana for a bit, and then we decided we'd make our own fortune in Washington, D.C. In February 1969, we came back to Washington. My husband and I both went to the College of William and Mary [Williamsburg, Virginia]. My undergraduate degree was in something enormously practical, which was Philosophy [laughter]. I loved it. I mean I loved writing, and I enjoyed the degree, but it really had very little workplace resonance [chuckle] when I was putting together my resume.

We were going to both work on the [Capitol] Hill, so we went up and started knocking on doors. I was relatively apolitical. Being raised in a military family, I was not Republican or Democrat, and so I was knocking on any door that I came to. I was hired within a week, which was terrific, by Mark Hatfield, the senator from Oregon, a Republican, and because I couldn't type—it just was one of those things I'd tried to take at the YMCA [Young Men's Christian Association] and hated. I never learned how to type, so they hired me as a research assistant. I worked for about a year and a half for Senator Hatfield, and my husband worked also on the Hill, for Senator [Stuart] Symington.

We saved our money to go back to graduate school, and we were funding that ourselves. So we went back to graduate school and went back first to his home state, Montana, and got a master's degree at the University of Montana [Missoula]. He had some interest in possibly going back to the state and running in politics, and since he had not gone to school [as an] undergraduate there, he felt he should get a degree within the state. Then, from the University of Montana, we applied as a married couple to graduate school, which is an interesting experience, because we could only go someplace that would accept us both. Fortunately, our records were fairly identical, our exam scores and everything else, but there were some schools that accepted me and not him and vice versa. But we did both get offered full tuition scholarships to Tufts University [Medford, Massachusetts] and also assistantships, which was very helpful economically.

So we went back to Tufts University for a Ph.D. program that was a brand new program. They really weren't ready for it yet. They had not been able to really get into it, and so from there, we started cross-registering at the Fletcher School and ended up completing our graduate studies at the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy [Tufts University]. Afterwards, we actually went back to Montana—we'd put our stuff in storage—thinking we might be able to make a life there and see what could be there. But there was so little opportunity, and we had academic debts to pay off, so we spent a couple of months looking for jobs. Nothing really panned out that would pay sufficiently for us to meet our debt requirements and whatever.

Early Career

LIVINGSTONE: So we came back to Washington. I went back on the Hill, and I worked from 1973 to 1981 on the Hill again, which is an unusually long length of time, for both Republican and Democrat during that time. In 1981, I had really been on the Hill, at that point, about nine years, and I figured this is more than enough. I was then working for a Republican. It was during the [President Ronald] Reagan administration, and I asked him if he would assist me in getting a position within the executive branch of the government.

So I was hired to do—I was, I think, deputy chief of legislative liaison to the Community Services Administration [CSA], and our job was basically to close the Community Services Administration down. This was the first closure. We actually did it. It was the first, and I think still, only closure of a federal agency, except for the World War II wartime boards. There has

been a lot of talk about closing things, but it's always very difficult to really shut an agency down. It had fallen on hard times.

It was a fascinating experience, because we had bomb threats every day and sickouts. But the Community Services Administration had been the subject of a lot of *60 Minutes* reports and other things. They just had not gotten the care and feeding that they needed, or the kind of leadership they needed, for years. One of the sad things about it was that some of the people told us there that, had they had the same attention, care, and feeding that we brought to the closure during the time that they were supposed to be active, things could have been so much different at that agency. But it was an interesting experience.

From CSA, I was asked if I wanted to stay in the administration. I said, yes, I would. I'd like to do anything except congressional liaison again, because that was my job, and I had already done that, and would they please find me something new. So I went in as an executive assistant to the Associate Deputy Administrator for Logistics of the VA [Veterans Administration]. I stayed at that for a couple of years. He left to another job. I was selected to succeed him in his position and became, basically, head of Construction, Procurement, and the Office of Small and Disadvantaged Business Utilization, the facilities aspects of the VA, among other things. I stayed at the VA from '81 to '89 in different roles and had different positions.

Then in 1989, I again felt I had stayed there a sufficient amount of time, and one agency I'd always wanted to work in was the Department of Defense, so I asked if there could be any opportunity there.

Getting Started at the Department of Defense

MOORHUS: Who did you ask [about working for the DOD]?

LIVINGSTONE: Well, just anybody I could, actually—the White House, the people that were willing to go to bat for me at places. I just wrote letters to a number of people saying I was interested in possibly seeking a position and might there be one. It's very interesting, because those jobs are—I mean anything's hard to get. It really is. In my case, my entire career has been, I hope, somewhat part talent, but also, it's an enormous amount of luck, just pure luck. In my case, I was one of probably umpteen thousands of resumes that were being sent over and like a number of people that were passing resumes for consideration for positions, but in this

case, I had a friend who was the next door neighbor of somebody who was going through those resumes at Defense and happened to be one of those that handled mine, so I was actually looked at and called up to come over for an interview.

At that point, I thought it was funny, because I didn't know what position I wanted, and I just would have been thrilled with anything. But they said, "Well, gee, you've worked construction at the VA, and you also did all the procurement of supplies and logistical stuff for the VA, so possibly Assistant Secretary of the Army for Installations, Logistics and Environment [ASA(I,L&E)]." Well, Army logistics is not VA logistics, and well, construction can be somewhat similar, but it was a big leap. Let's put it that way. Anyway, I was nominated for the position, confirmed for the position, and served there from November '89 until January '93, and I think to this day, it was probably the best job I ever had.

It was a remarkable experience, remarkable people there at that time, one of those things where you're just very, very fortunate to have people that are motivated the right way and trying to do the right thing at the right time. There was very little game-playing going on. Egos didn't seem to intervene as much, perhaps, as you hear in Washington, D.C. It was just a great team at that time, so I loved that job.

After the Army job, in January of '93, I left. I went to work for the American Red Cross. I was Vice President for Health and Safety Services, and what made that job truly fascinating, other than that it was just a wonderful organization, is that my section of the Red Cross was a for-profit. It was not a non-profit, so I was actually really getting into marketing and bottom lines. I signed the largest publishing contract in U.S. history for all the medical training books that the Red Cross uses. But it was really interesting, because I was learning a whole other aspect.

Then after the Red Cross job, I stayed on as a consultant for a while. I also became CEO [Chief Executive Officer] of the Association of the United States Army. I also was serving on some other boards. For instance, I was part of two studies for the Defense Science Board pertaining to logistics transformation. Then when the second Bush administration came in, I was called and asked if I was interested in possibly being considered, and I said, yes, I would be. I got interviewed by all three potential service secretaries and was selected to be Undersecretary of the Navy.

Secretary [Donald] Rumsfeld had a very clear vision of two things during that selection process. One was that the service secretaries would be from the private sector and be able to bring very strong business capabilities and private sector practices to the Pentagon. The second thing [was] that, if you had served there before, like I had, you were not going “home” (i.e., back to the same service you’d worked in before)—and I actually agreed with that, although there was a part of me [that was] disappointed—but I understood the potential, that you were already bringing in pre-conceived notions and ideas of the time before. So there was sort of a mix-and-match. If you had served in the Army before, you weren’t brought back to the Army. It would be either Air Force or Navy and Marine Corps, or OSD.

I retired in January 2003 and then subsequently was asked by NASA [National Aeronautics and Space Administration] administrator, Sean O’Keefe, if I’d like to be part of a group that was going to be providing independent advice to the administrator on return to flight of the shuttle after the [shuttle] *Columbia* disaster. It sounded fascinating to me and has proven to be that, and to this day, I’m still doing that. It was supposed to be a relatively short-term job, but it’s been going on—I started that, I guess, in about July of 2003, and here we are in April 2005.

MOORHUS: Is it about to fly again?

LIVINGSTONE: It remains to be seen. It will fly again, but right now, the current window is May 15th to June 3rd, and they’re going to be hard pressed to make that window.

MOORHUS: Okay. That’s a great overview. What was your husband doing during this time?

LIVINGSTONE: He also worked on the Hill, initially, when we first moved back here prior to the graduate school time. Then when we came back in 1973 after grad school, he again worked for a senator. I was working for a House member and then subsequently his successor. He worked for two years, from ’73 to ’75. Then he went into the private sector, and he was doing a number of different things and consulting, private sector business stuff.

But his predominate specialty was counterterrorism, oddly enough, at that time in 1975. So he was a very early precursor in the field, and he’s written

nine books on the subject. They've been used as academic textbooks in a lot of courses over the years, and he himself did some teaching at Georgetown University [Washington, D.C.] as an adjunct professor at night when he had time. Today, he is a CEO and head of his own firm called GlobalOptions, Inc., which is a risk management, crisis management firm.

MOORHUS: Interesting.

LIVINGSTONE: Yes.

2 Working in the Army

Coworkers

MOORHUS: Okay, let's talk about the Army now. You said it was a great group of people, so let's start with the people, and who the people were that you began working with. Let's start there and then with the issues that you were facing.

LIVINGSTONE: Okay. Well, the Secretary of the Army at the time was Mike Stone. He is now deceased. In fact, not too long after we all left at the end of the [George H.W.] Bush I administration, he had a melanoma, I believe, on his back. It was discovered when he and his wife were at the Galapagos Islands. He became ill on that trip and died two weeks later.

MOORHUS: Oh, my gosh.

LIVINGSTONE: So it was very quick developing. So Mike Stone was Secretary. John Shannon was Undersecretary—were they under or deputies? I'm forgetting. Anyway, he was the number two, I guess Undersecretary of the Army. Then we had—oh, if I can remember this—Steve Conner was the Assistant Secretary for Research, Development and Acquisition. We had Doug Brook, who was Financial Management Assistant Secretary. Kim Wincup was Assistant Secretary for Personnel [s/b for Manpower and Reserve Affairs], and I think there was another title in that at that point. Nancy Dorn was Assistant Secretary for Civil Works [ASA(CW)] but not initially. She came in later.

MOORHUS: She came in '91.

LIVINGSTONE: Yes, she came in later, and—

MOORHUS: Was Robert Page still there?

LIVINGSTONE: Yes, Bob Page, I think, was the Assistant Secretary [for Civil Works] initially, so there were five of us, and then my position, which was Installation, Logistics, and Environment. I have to say I think I had the best job of all of them, and the reason is that I've always loved jobs that had sort of unbounded portfolios. Mine tended to be so unbounded that,

when new issues came up, and they didn't know where to put them, sometimes they would come down to my area. So it was a constant learning experience and opportunity just to see and broaden out into a lot of different arenas, so it was just a terrific job.

In my own office, I had—oh, gosh, I'm just trying to remember. [Lewis] Dee Walker was the Deputy Assistant Secretary [DAS] for Environment, Safety, and Occupational Health. Paul Johnson was the Deputy Assistant Secretary for Installations and [Housing]. There was another title similar to that, and Eric Orsini was the DAS for Logistics. Jim DeWire came in later, and he headed my integration and budget shop. Mike Owen was my number two, and Mike was there before I came in. He had actually been hired before I came into the job. Who am I forgetting? [Is there] anybody I'm leaving out that you recall?

MOORHUS: No.

LIVINGSTONE: Interestingly enough, it was an incredibly stable organization. Paul Johnson and Eric Orsini, I think, are now both retired. Eric just recently retired. I don't know how old Eric was, but he was well in his 80s [laughter].

Paul Johnson retired after I left, but he also was probably at least late 70s or getting into the 80s. Dee had been there quite some time, too, so there was an incredible amount of continuity and stability there. These were all wonderful individuals, but in Paul and Eric's case, they had been there for an incredibly long time. I think I was the first woman ever to have held my position in the Army, and they weren't quite sure what to make of me. We ended up having a very, very good relationship. But it's interesting when you have long-term people who have been there, and we political types come and go—there's always a kind of sniffing-around-the-dog part, just trying to figure out everybody for a while and making sure that you can develop that kind of trust and relationship that you hope you can, and we were able to do that fairly quickly, which was great.

MOORHUS: You brought up the fact that you were the only woman in this group until Nancy Dorn arrived, so how were you accepted by the people that were basically your peers and above you?

LIVINGSTONE: Fabulous. That's all I can tell you, and it included the uniformed military. I absolutely had no hint of hesitation, and that's why I'm talking about what a good team it was. It wasn't who you were. It was what you were able to bring to the table, and that's how the judgments were made, and I always felt that that's how the judgments were made. That's the way the judgments should be made—and whether or not you were a value-added [person].

I do remember, when I first came in to be Assistant Secretary for I,L&E, I was sitting there—I'm a workaholic, and I was used to just tons of work coming into my office, and I'm sort of a detail freak. I'm sitting there at my desk, and this is like week one or two, or something, and nothing was coming in—just a few letters to sign and a few whatever. By the first week, I was asking the people in my immediate front office, “What is this [chuckle]? This is obviously not the job,” and they said, “Well, yes, it sort of is.” Then it dawned on me that this was going to be a bit of a push-pull and that I needed to make those relationships happen.

It was during budget time for the Pentagon, and you always follow the dollars. I knew that, and that's always important to be part of that process. I remember making some pronouncement, from my lofty position of being assistant secretary, of something I wanted to occur in a budgetary line item, and I'd made it maybe at 7:00 o'clock at night. Everyone sort of said, “Yes, okay great, whatever.” I came back in the next morning, and I found out there had been a Council of Colonels meeting that had happened like at 10:00 o'clock that night that I had missed, and everything had gotten overturned. By the time I showed up again, all of that had been changed.

So the next day, I said, “Okay, I'm just staying here as long as anybody stays,” and that's exactly what I did. I actually showed up at the Council of Colonels. They were shocked and appalled. They said, “You shouldn't be here. This is really not at your level to be here,” and I said, “No, I'm just trying to learn the process, and I just want to see what's done in these meetings, how they interact, and whatever.” Whatever happened as a result of that and, I guess, just relationships beginning to develop, stuff just started flowing in.

They figured I wasn't going to go away and that I was rooting around too much, and there was a—I didn't mean this in a nosy way. I really just wanted to learn. I didn't understand, and I was used to understanding

processes. This was new for me. They told me, “Look, you don’t have to come to these. We will give you all the stuff,” and that happened from then on out, and I had an incredible flow of intel [intelligence] and information that came out of the Army Staff ever since, for all the rest of the time I was there. I had tremendous insights, and again, on all different levels.

Another thing: Coming from a civilian agency into a military agency, it’s not always the Senior Executive Service [SES] folks or the general officers that know the best stuff. It’s actually the people working it that know the best stuff and know the details. You can watch the body language when briefings are going awry and somebody just knows that there’s a different twist that should be put on it. I had never been a great follower of protocol. In a civilian agency, you don’t have that much anyway, but I particularly never appreciated the great rank distinctions in civilian agencies.

So I also didn’t follow those as closely, probably, as one might have expected me to in the Pentagon, and the general officers were great with that. They knew, after a while, that there were action officers that I wanted to hear from. Everybody in that room had a say. It wasn’t just the general officer coming in and giving the party line. People were expected to have a good flow of conversation, and again, that gets back to the type of team we had there.

For some people in positions of power, as it evolved, that’s hard for them to do. They’ve earned their right to be gods, so to speak, or to set that tone, and it takes a very, I guess, firm and self-confident ego to be able to deal with that kind of free flow. But it’s the only way I’ve been able to deal with issues, because I like to learn a lot, and at the policy level there’s no universal truth—I mean I don’t know the truth. You don’t know the truth. No one knows. It’s never black and white, and the more you can hear and roil around, the whole seems to come together in a more healthy fashion.

Anyway, it was just a particularly good group of people and very bright people. [Major General] Bill Reno was there at the time, and Bill was particularly good about that. He was informal himself. He was the PA&E [Program Analysis and Evaluation] guy [with a] very, very strong intellect but also very pleased to have his action officers come up, do the briefings, and bring things to me. There was nothing hidden or whatever.

Jim Ross was the DCSLOG [Deputy Chief of Staff for Logistics]. [Major General] Bill Stofft was there at the time and [Brigadier General] Tom Montgomery. Just wonderful, wonderful people. [General] Carl Vuono was Chief of Staff of the Army when I initially arrived, and then [General] Gordon Sullivan, and both of them were just spectacularly fine and wonderful to me in terms of supporting me and actually giving me the opportunity to do things. You'd be down in the command center, and all of a sudden, you'd get that bark from Carl Vuono, "Susan, now what do you think about this?" [laughter]. It was a different culture being drawn in like the Army did on the civilian side, at least during that time, and I think they still do that pretty well, whereas, it is a less comfortable relationship in the Department of the Navy.

MOORHUS: I notice that you refer to all of the general officers by their first name—

LIVINGSTONE: Yes.

MOORHUS: —and that they called you that as well.

LIVINGSTONE: Well, we didn't do that in meetings, but we certainly did it one-on-one. Sometimes we did it at meetings just because we all became very good friends, not social friends, but business friends. Even then, I mean in my own office, the action officers or the executive officers I would have—I was first Mrs. Livingstone, and then I just became Mrs. L, and everyone just called me Mrs. L. [laughter].

MOORHUS: It sounds like a good working environment.

LIVINGSTONE: Yes, and just really fine people, really good people.

Development of Army Environmental Strategy

MOORHUS: Let's start with the environment. What were the environmental issues that were on your plate from the very beginning? Do you remember?

LIVINGSTONE: Yes. It's hard to sum them up, because there were so many. I think the overarching thing for me, at the time when I came in, was the Army, like all the other services, was doing just wonderful things. I mean they had good programs going and very dedicated people in their

environmental areas working those issues, but there was not any overarching, integrated whole to it. The other thing was that it wasn't even really a program. It was sort of like 1,000 flowers blooming but no garden, and with these 1,000 flowers blooming, there was not a gardener. But even then, you didn't want that garden just to be stand-alone.

You didn't want it to be just a program like, "I'm environment. I'm safety. I'm this." Things like safety and things like the environment can't just be an extraneous add-on. They have got to be deeply embedded throughout the organization and the organizational culture for them to really work, to be meaningful, and that's all the way from the Secretary of Defense, down through the services, down to the troops out there training, doing maneuvers, or whatever. Everybody's got to think about it, and that part was missing.

So what we tried to do, and Dee [Walker] was very, very active on this, and I was just a really strong proponent, was try to evolve an overarching strategy that would begin to embrace that and operationalize environmental stewardship as an actual part of the operational concept of the Army. When you're in a military organization, if it doesn't add value to the mission, the down-in-the-field war-fight mission, it's very difficult for you to sell that or to make sense of it, because there are so many other competing priorities.

What we tried to do, and I think were relatively successful [with], was to embed that as an operational aspect of the Army. That there was payoff to environmental stewardship. That it affected money. That environmental practices impacted on your training capabilities, for instance, if you were not able to sustain your training areas or maneuver areas because of environmental stewardship problems. It just pervaded everything the Army did, particularly in terms of readiness. Safety was the same thing, actually, and we undertook initiatives in that area as well. But anyway, on environment, we developed an overarching strategy for the environmental program and linked that to installation management and quality of life programs, and then linked those to fulfillment of the overall Army war-fight mission.

In addition, the Assistant Secretary of the Army for I,L&E, at that time, was the executive agent for the Department of Defense for the Chemical Demilitarization Program. A huge component of that was environmental—

the concerns, the issues, environmental and safety obviously, in terms of demilling the stockpile. Also, I,L&E had the base realignment and closures [BRAC]. We had the military construction program and logistics programs. So it was a good confluence, actually, of programmatic areas in I,L&E that sort of brought all this together into a cohesive whole and was able to give rise to this strategy that tried to merge all this together. Rather than these little individual stovepipe programs and everyone doing their own thing, the environmental strategy gave a framework to bring it all together and a context that this really was just an integral part of the everyday operational aspect of the Army.

MOORHUS: That took some time to develop the strategy that was then summarized in the Four Pillars [Compliance, Restoration, Pollution Prevention and Conservation].

LIVINGSTONE: Yes. I've got a document here. I think it was actually signed off in November of 1992.

MOORHUS: Yes.

LIVINGSTONE: That was when it signed off, and it was signed off by the Secretary and the Chief of Staff, always critical. In a military organization that has the civilian political side to it as well as the uniform side, it is imperative that you get that partnership. Otherwise, if it's just the political side, it goes bye-bye as soon as you go bye-bye. Also, what you really want to do is, if you're going to embed something, you've got to embed it on the uniform side. But the strategy did that.

Yes, it took time. I came in in November of '89, and it was finally signed off in November of '92. But that's okay, because a lot of times in the evolution of something, in the development of a strategy and a vision, two-thirds or more of your marketing and your embedding starts occurring already, and we took a long time letting everybody play with it, from the war fighters to the environmental folks to—everyone had a crack at it to kind of say, "This works." "This doesn't work." "How are we going to operationalize that?" "I don't think this makes sense." "This will cost too much." "This is a competing priority." "How do we balance those things out?" So we spent an enormous amount of time—we lobbed the grenade out there and just let everyone play around with the fragments, and it became a better whole as a result and a fairly long-lasting whole just because people at all levels, ci-

vilian and uniform, had a chance to participate in its development. It wasn't top-down driven, "Here it is. Take it and go for it."

MOORHUS: What were some of the tactics you used in terms of getting it out there and getting it accepted?

LIVINGSTONE: A lot of them were just drafts. I mean just sending written things out, and anybody and their brother—we wanted to hear from them, I mean at all levels. We're talking from general officers down to troop levels to the civilian side, to the labs, to everyone. Part of it was just letting it float through the system and letting everyone have a crack at it. Part of it was the normal marketing routine, which was speech-making, articles, throwing things out there, Congress—I mean just saying, "We're on this, and here's what we're thinking about." We also alerted the White House we were doing this environmental strategy—it was just sort of a long—marketing's sort of the wrong word, in a way, but it was a long socialization period, shall we say.

MOORHUS: Some consciousness-raising?

LIVINGSTONE: Well, yes, consciousness-raising, but there wasn't resistance to the effort. I think what it was is that the Army was doing so many good things and actually was trying in many areas to do the right things that none of it had been put together in a cohesive whole and none of it they were getting credit for, and there was very little recognition of what it really meant operationally to them. At the same time, there were all the external pressures coming to bear. There were all the increasing environmental regulations both in the U.S. and OCONUS [outside the Continental U.S.], all the Superfund sites—the services were getting beaten up for not being sensitive, so there were a lot of factors—it was just the right time, I think, for it all to come together.

There was general recognition that environmental issues were affecting all of their programs. From conventional ammunition and all the demil [demilitarization] of that to the Chemical Demil Program to logistics practices. Then you had base realignment and closures happening, which posed huge environmental issues, what to do to restore these sites so that they could be returned to the public, and recognition of the high cost of past environmental practices and that every dollar spent was a dollar away from operational needs. I mean it had to be balanced out. So it was the

recognition of all of that coming together, that the environment was critically important for numerous reasons, not from just the reason that it was the right thing to do but also for our legacy and for the future of these installations and for training and readiness. As the number of military installations became reduced through BRAC, the number of training areas became reduced. That further underscored that the ones you have, you'd better darn well take care of, and you'd better know what's environmentally out there, because you'll get the Desert Tortoise or the Red-cockaded Woodpecker or some other environmental concern out there that can really, really impact on effective training. So it became, I think, just a number of things that were going on at the same time that made it ripe to be able to undertake the environmental strategy—a confluence of need and the right time.

MOORHUS: Yes, and your position was the first time that the environment had been raised to that level on the Army Staff.

LIVINGSTONE: I think you're right. I think the "E" was a recent addition to the I,L&E title.

MOORHUS: Right.

LIVINGSTONE: I had sort of forgotten that. I think it was Installations and Logistics, and then they added the Environment. Mike Stone [Secretary of the Army], himself, was—he came from California, and he was a very strong environmentalist himself, so there was tremendous top leadership support for all of this. Gordon Sullivan was the Chief of Staff at the time the strategy was going forward—just a very visionary individual that also saw the importance of all this. So you had the right leadership, as I said, the right team, both uniform and civilian at the time, and a lot of support from Secretary [Richard] Cheney. The Bush I White House also was getting very active in environmental issues, so it just became, as I said, the right time and the right thing to do. I think the strategy has been relatively successful.

I don't know if the Four Pillars still exist within the construct today. I haven't kept up with it. I did read the recent Green Book that the Association of the United States Army puts out, and I didn't see a reference to it, but you don't need a taxonomy if it's embedded. If it's not embedded, then you still need to have something that focuses people's thoughts, but anyway for

a while, those Four Pillars were something that everybody—I mean you could talk to people, and people could just roil them off. Then on the uniform side, and the Corps of Engineers in particular, took those Four Pillars and put operational goals for achievement on each one.

The strategy also called for an annual report on moving toward all these goals and the specific things that were going to be done to actually operationalize the strategy and track programs. Visions that don't get operationalized are meaningless; there are too many of them in this town, so it was important. You can write a beautiful vision, and you can have a nice strategy, but actually, it's totally meaningless if nothing gets really executed or tracked. So this was something that was brought together as a whole. This was not just to put out a nice color brochure and pat yourself on the back. The environmental strategy set the vision and overarching goals. It required operational goals and objectives. It required specific initiatives that could be tracked for progress. And, as I said, it required and received a lot of leadership attention to it.

MOORHUS: Do you remember specific issues that you were facing, for example pollution or contamination?

LIVINGSTONE: All of the above [laughter].

MOORHUS: All of the above.

LIVINGSTONE: I mean, in addition to their own environmental challenges, the good old Army was the executive agent for the Department of Defense for a lot of environmental programs. They had all the Formerly Used Defense Sites [FUDS], the Super Fund sites, and they had all of the things like the Rocky Mountain Arsenal [Commerce City, Colorado] that were very contentious issues at the time. The Army was also executive agent for the Chemical Demilitarization Program, which again, from an environmental and safety point of view, [was] very, very contentious and a huge public concern about having a plant destroying chemicals in your locale. Then there was contamination from years of different kinds of past practices that the military services had had. There were significant issues from the World War II era and prior years, when I think the whole environmental issue was, "If it's out of sight, it's out of mind," so we'd just bury it. Gosh knows what was buried where, and that's still coming home to roost from those kinds of decisions.

So, by the time we initiated the environmental strategy, there was solid recognition that decisions made then are huge bill-payers today and precluding those bills in its future was something that the uniform side of the Army embraced wholeheartedly. They got that message really quickly. Whatever they're doing today is going to impact on readiness tomorrow, because it's going to take huge dollars away.

That led to support of the importance of prevention programs, so the issue there became, "It's easier to not do it than to have to pay for it later, so let's see what we can do on pollution prevention." The growth in federal level compliance programs also meant that the services had to meet much more stringent regulatory aspects. That was difficult, because you're merging a very important national security, national defense mission in with a much more rigorous compliance environment and, at times, it was not easy to make a translation between national security versus the Red-cockaded Woodpecker. That can be a tough sell when you're trying to train a young troop to go through the woods and make sure that they don't affect a nesting site but still do realistic training.

All of that was frustrating at times to the Army, but they knew it had to be done. There was a recognition of not stonewalling or fighting your way through or, "Let's get back at the regulators and tell them, 'Let's appeal this,'" or whatever. It was basically saying, "Okay, how can we do this and still fulfill our mission well? Let's find a way forward." So, given that great attitude, they were very successful, I think, in trying to find ways to do that. Nothing's perfect, of course, and as we talk now twelve years later from the time I left, there's still tons of work to be done. But there was, I think, a great embracement at that time of the environment, a great understanding of it in terms of its impact on readiness, and the need to effectively deal with it in the operational environment on a fairly daily basis.

Cleanup of Rocky Mountain Arsenal

MOORHUS: You mentioned Rocky Mountain Arsenal as one of the major issues. Did you actually travel to a site like Rocky Mountain?

LIVINGSTONE: Yes, I went out to Rocky Mountain Arsenal. It's a good news story today. The interesting thing about military installations is, because they're fairly large tracts of land that have been relatively underutilized, given the encroachment of development and expansion in the private sector, the reason that you have a lot of these environmental issues

and some of the issues of endangered species is because they can live there. Military installations have become one of the last remaining homes and refuges they have. For instance, there's old growth pine at Fort Bragg [North Carolina], because everybody else around them had been allowed to cut them down. So Fort Bragg is now one of the last nesting areas for the Red-cockaded Woodpecker.

It's ironic in a way. The military gets beaten up because they actually protected habitat. "You need to do this. You need to do that." It was always frustrating, because why didn't anybody ever say that in the private domain? Obviously, when money's to be made, and you're making subdivisions, the old growth pine's not nearly as important. It's easier at a military installation to say, "Well, change your maneuver strategies and training strategies and bypass these areas."

In terms of Rocky Mountain Arsenal, it's an incredibly polluted site, but because of that pollution, because of the way that it had basically been fenced off for so long, it also became an incredible wildlife refuge with bald eagle sightings and one thing or another. It ended up being a very good news story—a very, very expensive good news story. You pay for having to retract things that were buried and not handled to today's standards. I won't say inappropriately handled, because it's always difficult to judge history sometimes, because what we think is common sense and very dangerous today had different perspectives back in World War II and other eras. But anyway, the Rocky Mountain Arsenal was just really a wonderful, I think, good news story.

I was out there. The folks were so proud of what they were doing. They had school children coming out, and they were showing them that they were trying to clean up but also showing them the wildlife species that were out there. They had, I think, bald eagle sightings for bird watchers at certain points. So it was a very unusual mix of a very dangerous, polluted area going through a significant, expensive, and complicated cleanup, [while] at the same time preserving the wildlife that had moved in on top of all of this. The folks who were out there doing it were incredibly motivated. They really felt privileged, I think, to be able to work that site.

I pulled this brochure out this morning. I haven't even looked through it again, but you can see [indicating brochure] they had all kinds of environmental materials, calendars, recycling wheels, and so forth. They had

just wonderful environmental educational materials that were available for the public and for people that were visiting the Arsenal. These are old, and you can see, basically, the massively polluted [areas], but also the incredible wildlife out there. It was a premiere urban wildlife refuge with the airport right over on the side.

MOORHUS: By the time you came in, the lawsuit was working and the cleanup had begun. Is that correct?

LIVINGSTONE: Yes, the cleanup had begun. There was still a lot of residual suspicion, I think, between the local politicians and whether the Army was really going to do all of these things. But the commitment was there from the Department of the Army, and it was just a matter of gaining their trust to let them know that we were going to do it and it would get done. I was just looking at this Federal Facilities Agreement. I think I had something to do with that. I've forgotten what it was, to tell you the truth. It was with the governor. It was really trying to assure the public out in Colorado and also the politicians in Colorado that the Department of the Army was absolutely committed to do what needed to be done.

The timelines for some of these were always of issue, because they were always very expensive. Everything was very expensive. You needed to plan out a restoration strategy that would meet the needs of both sides but also had to be common sense in terms of the resources that were going to be available.

Visiting Installations

MOORHUS: Beyond the specific situation of Rocky Mountain, did you travel to other facilities, and was that an important piece of your position?

LIVINGSTONE: Yes, I did travel to a number of different facilities, including Johnston Atoll [South Pacific], with the first chemical plant that went hot and is now closed, fortunately, and did its job. Yes, it was important. It was important from several perspectives—important for my education, for me to actually be out there and see what things were, to meet the people that were working on them, and to hear their concerns and their issues. And it was important for them, for the facilities themselves, to hear from people like me where I was heading, what I was thinking of, what my concerns and issues were, what the policy directives we were working on or might have just promulgated were, what challenges lay ahead—

whatever. Then there's the natural sort of motivational aspects that are important—the “atta-boy” “atta-girl” things that you want to tell people when you're out on trips like that.

In some respects, too, it can't always be good news. I mean you have to go out there, and sometimes you have to really kind of push. “We have to get this done” and need to focus on things in a very hard way, a closer way, a different way, or whatever. Ironically, my very, very first trip for the Department of the Army was not a high point of my Army environmental career. The Secretary and the Chief of Staff of the Army, Carl Vuono and Mike Stone, had a very excellent idea, and that was to take all of these new assistant secretaries that had come on board and didn't really know each other very well, and put them on a plane with Bill Stofft (at least I believe I recall correctly it was Bill and I, not Tom Montgomery).

Bill Stofft was a general officer, but Bill was an incredible historian in his own right and a very articulate guy. They just put him on a plane with the assistant secretaries and we traveled around to different types of [installations], like a combat installation, arsenal, or whatever. We were also given the experience to touch, feel, shoot, fire, fly, and ride in whatever Army munitions and vehicles, eat MREs, and observe numerous aspects of Army training and programs. I am not a great show-and-tell person. Normally, I don't like that kind of trip, where it might be perceived you are having more fun than contributing substance. There's a tendency sometimes to say, “Well, let's get the political people off and let them have fun on the side. Maybe they'll stay out of our hair.” This trip, however, was not intended to do that. We were up at 5:00 a.m. We worked until 10:00 or 11:00 o'clock at night and started up again the next day. It went on for about five or six days with Bill Stofft in between telling us history all the time. We were getting a graduate-level education in Army history.

It was like a staff ride, a very intense staff ride. It was very good for people that perhaps had had military experience or people that didn't, like myself—I had not been in uniform myself—to actually be able to look at or see, or if I wanted to fire, which I did, the capabilities of some of the munitions and weapons. We were in an Apache helicopter doing night fire exercises. We were in Bradley fighting vehicles and Hummers [Humvees]. We went down a whole line and shot all kinds of munitions. And when it was over and done with, then you never had to do it again. The next time you visited these installations, it could be all business. So as political appoint-

ees, you weren't going off to military installations later and spending valuable time succumbing to the lure of going for some little fun trip or experience on the side. This concept of the first trip, however, was incredibly educational and helped forge our team. It also brought us up to date on the Army's training, doctrine, and capabilities.

Anyway, back to my environmental embarrassment. Here I am in what I recall was a Bradley fighting vehicle, and I'm driving it. Or more accurately, they're letting me try to drive it. It obviously doesn't steer like an automobile, so I'm trying to figure out the steering. I think it was Fort Benning [Georgia]—maybe it was Fort Hood [Texas], but I think it was Fort Benning. My very first act as Assistant Secretary of the Army for Installations, Logistics and the Environment was to run over a tree.

MOORHUS: Oh my.

LIVINGSTONE: I took out a tree at Fort Benning. Well, I just was mortified. There was a part of it that was just so ironic. I mean, it was humorous. I couldn't believe it. I remember I offered to buy them a new tree [laughter]. It was a little sapling, but you really didn't want to do that, particularly as ASA (I,L&E). Anyway, so all the rest of the time I was in the Army, I always told that story on myself, that, "You guys are out there doing—you guys meaning men and women in uniform—maneuvers and having to do it in an environmentally sound manner. I just want to let you know, on my first opportunity, I took out this nice new sapling that you all had just planted at your installation. So I've got great respect for the difficulties of environmentally delicate maneuvering." It was funny but also humbling and educational to the challenges of environmentally friendly training.

MOORHUS: Did you get involved with wetlands at all?

LIVINGSTONE: Some, not much. That really fell mostly in the Civil Works side. There would be issues if it were on a military installation or if military construction was affected, but in terms of wetlands in the broader scope, that fell under the Assistant Secretary of the Army for Civil Works.

MOORHUS: But if it were on an installation, then it would be under you?

LIVINGSTONE: Well, yes, all the compliance. If I recall correctly, there were the trades you could make. If you were doing something here, you had to rebuild or affect a wetland exchange over here, so it did come up in terms of military installations and military construction.

Base Realignment and Closure

MOORHUS: You mentioned the base realignment and closure, BRAC. How did you get involved with BRAC? What was the relationship between BRAC and the environment side?

LIVINGSTONE: Well, I was designated by the Secretary of the Army to be in charge of BRAC for the Army on the civilian side. Obviously, we had a very strong, huge team that involved numerous people, both civilian and military. I did most of the testimony on base realignment and closure, most of the presentations up in the Office of Secretary of Defense, most of the Army BRAC closure defenses, and, as a political appointee, deservedly most of getting beaten up on the Hill by members who didn't like what we were doing, or one thing or another.

A huge component of BRAC was trying to guesstimate, as best you could, the cleanup or restoration costs of a potential closure site, because at the first round of BRAC, if I recall correctly, there was supposed to be a six-year pay back. Well, if you're spending X amount of billions on cleanup, there was a huge discussion of where, when, how much; what did cleanup or restoration mean. However, to my recollection, there was never a decision not to close something because it was not environmentally affordable to close, or because it was too expensive to clean up.

For instance, there were cases like Jefferson Proving Ground [JPG, Madison, Indiana] that we closed that we could not afford to clean up within any time frame approximating six years. Those were the most difficult ones to effectively communicate to the public and to the members of Congress that had those sites, because basically, we're telling them, "We're closing off an installation. You're going to lose whatever income and whatever employment capability came from that installation, but oh by the way, we can't afford to clean it up." In this case, Jefferson Proving Ground had an incredible amount of ordnance from over a long period of time. It was basically just going to be fenced off and slowly, slowly as it could be done, the Army would clean it up. This process was going to be incredibly difficult and very long term, so BRAC instances like JPG were difficult.

BRAC was a very emotional issue. No one wanted to lose their military installation. Almost without exception, even places where you could see the subsequent economic value and benefit to them like Fort Ord [California], there was very strong opposition initially to closing. No one wanted to lose their military installations. I did a lot of the road trips that went out and represented the Army at the public meetings, with usually the local member of Congress or the senator and all the town fathers, mothers, and sometimes just lots of folks from the public. It could get very, very emotional where people were just crying and talking about generations of having worked there and how much this has meant to them since 19-whatever. There was incredible love of that relationship in a lot of communities, so they were very difficult.

From the environmental point of view, again, it was effectively trying to estimate or guesstimate up front the extent and cost of cleanup so you could try to budget and provide a schedule for that during these closure processes. Then afterwards, once they were closed, the public expectation really was, “We want it now, as quickly as we can get it. Since you guys have left us and abandoned us—we didn’t want you to go, but you’re gone now. So for gosh sakes, clean it up, and turn it over so we can do something with it.” So then it became trying to do things as quickly as possible and with the most effective processes possible.

MOORHUS: Okay, we’re going to end this session, and we’ll pick it up next time.

LIVINGSTONE: Great. I look forward to the continuing interview.

MOORHUS: Okay.

[End of 14 April 2005 Session]

Relationship With the Corps of Engineers

MOORHUS: I’d like you to start today by talking about the relationship between your office and the Army Corps of Engineers and the Army Staff in general.

LIVINGSTONE: Okay. To begin with, I have a cold today, so I'll apologize if I start wheezing and sneezing and coughing.

I served in the Department of the Army from November '89 until January 1993, and during that time, as I believe I previously said, the relationships between the civilian personnel and headquarters personnel, the political appointees, and the Army staff [were] very close. I would say that there were remarkably good relationships at that particular time. The Army staff had a very deeply-held ethic, or ethos I should say, of insuring that they recognized the constitutional issues of civilian control over the military and had formulated processes by which that was insured in terms of established meetings, access to information and meetings, and things of that nature that were both formalized and informal. On the informal side, on innumerable occasions Army senior uniformed personnel would specifically ask if a proposed action or position had been coordinated with or approved by civilian career and political leadership.

That said, as with any organization—I always kind of laugh, because it reminds me of Italy, where the political leadership turns over all the time, and the bureaucracy carries forward and runs the country. When you have organizations where that turnover does happen, and clearly that's the relationship between political appointees as they come in and out with the administration, there is a time in which both entities have to develop relationships and determine what the interactions are going to be at another level beyond these formalized and even informal processes, how close that's going to be, how the communications will occur, and what those partnerships will be. The establishment of those relationships is nothing more difficult or less difficult than when you're developing any human relationship. When the administration changes, new people, new faces come in with the new political administration team. The Army Staff was certainly welcoming and provided all the normal formal and informal opportunities but then also waited to see what kind of leadership interests and interactions that we might bring to that table. So that was just the normal process of organizational human relationships. But during our time, I would say that, overall, those relationships became very close.

In my case, my personal case, I believe they became very close, and I valued them. I carried them forward afterwards, when I left the Department of the Army. Later on, I was asked to be on an advisory group to the Association of the United States Army. Then they later asked me to be on the

Council of Trustees for the Association of the United States Army, and then after that, they elected me to be CEO [Chief Executive Officer] of the Association of the United States Army. I valued that continuity of relationships very highly. I still do today. I keep up with these folks. I heard from some last week. I get notes and one thing or another, and it's sort of that classic thing. Once part of the family, you're always part of the family, and for that, I value that relationship very highly.

In terms of the Corps of Engineers, again, a very close relationship, but I did have an organizational issue. The Corps of Engineers was both a major command and so outside of the Army Staff, but then the Chief of Engineers was dual-hatted for a period of time in terms of serving on the Army Staff and also head of the major command. So although relationships were, I would say, very close, also, at one point, I did have some organizational and managerial issues with the dual-hatted nature of the military side of the Corps. It was, I believe at that time, the only major command that was dual-hatted. To me, the managerial concern was that this dual-hattedness allowed a situation where the Corps could promulgate a policy, then go home, act on the policy, and then come back and evaluate itself. I felt this was an organizational principle that probably was not as clear as it should be in terms of the rest of the way the Army Staff was operating its businesses and did not provide sufficient checks and balances.

So that was one area in which I differed with their organizational inter-relationship with the Army Staff when I first came on board. Other than that, I came with high admiration for the Corps of Engineers already from my time on the Hill, where I dealt with them on water projects, and from my time at the VA [Veterans Administration]—I mean we had interactions during my construction programs with the Department of Veterans Affairs (then the Veterans Administration). My parents also lived on a Corps of Engineers project in Russellville, Arkansas.

Another interesting aspect of the Corps of Engineers as a major command was that it was divided between the Civil Works side and the Military Programs side. The Military Programs side fell more into my assistant secretary area, while the Civil Works was under the Assistant Secretary for Civil Works, and that always created a bit of difficulty in some respects for the Chief of Engineers, because at one time, the Chief of Engineers not only had two assistant secretaries to work with but also had the dual-hatted nature on the Army Staff, and of the course then, the Secretary of the Army

himself and the Chief of Staff of Army himself. It was a complicated organizational relationship dealing with a lot of multiple “policy” or other types of bosses, so to speak. But overall, the relationships were very close and remain valued today.

MOORHUS: This is jumping ahead a little bit, but it was while you were there that [Lieutenant] General [Henry] Hatch retired, and the next Chief of Engineers had to be selected. The final decision was that the selection would go to [Lieutenant General] Arthur Williams.

LIVINGSTONE: Yes.

MOORHUS: Were you involved, or did you have any input into that?

LIVINGSTONE: I don’t really recall, to tell you the truth. I may have been asked for my views on that or some kind of input, but those types of decisions were predominately made between the Chief of Staff of the Army and the Secretary of the Army, and I don’t recall having an active role. I probably was asked for my opinions or views, and I don’t recall if there were even two or three candidates vying when General Art Williams was being considered. I don’t know if he was the predominate one at the time. I just don’t recall, but I don’t remember that being a major input of mine, and I didn’t know Art Williams that well at the time.

MOORHUS: The gossip, I suppose one would say, is that [Major General] Peter Offringa was one of the candidates and that you had worked with him and that you either did support or were presumed to have supported his candidacy, whereas Art Williams had had a lot on the Civil Works side—

LIVINGSTONE: Yes.

MOORHUS: —a lot of involvement and was known and presumed to have been supported by Nancy Dorn.

LIVINGSTONE: Yes.

MOORHUS: Does any of that ring a bell or sound right?

LIVINGSTONE: It sounds like it could have happened, I mean clearly, because I didn't know Art Williams that well. He did work more on the Civil Works side. I did work closely with Pete Offringa and had high regard for him, so if there was any input that was asked for by either the Chief of Staff of the Army or the Secretary of the Army, I have no doubt I would have had high praise for Pete Offringa just because I knew him well. I'd worked very closely with him and have a high regard for him.

That said, I mean I did not know General Williams that well. So I can understand why, if Nancy Dorn had had that similarly close relationship, she may have had the same sense or feeling or input that I would have made for Pete Offringa. But again, I don't recall that being a major issue at the time, and I think people may overestimate the power that civilian political appointees have in general officer personnel selection for some of these positions.

Certainly, there are instances, I think over time, where Secretaries of Defense and others have blocked certain things or made choices, but normally, these career tracks are well-defined. There are well-defined processes within the Army Staff or whatever service you're dealing with for making these kinds of decisions, and the input on the secretariat side is more—we're looking at these candidates. Are these all right? Is there anybody that you have any major issues that you want to talk about or discuss, etc.? Again, I don't recall being specifically asked, but I may have been. Again, it's been a long time ago, but if I had, I probably would have had very strong recommendations for Pete Offringa and not been able to speak as well to Art Williams' position, being on the Civil Works side, because we didn't work that closely together.

MOORHUS: It's an interesting situation, and I suppose it raises the question about whether, in selecting a Chief of Engineers, involvement in the Civil Works side is more important or carries more weight than being more on the military side.

LIVINGSTONE: Having not worked that much on the Civil Works side, I would say, from a congressional point of view, that may well be true. Congress is very, very protective of the Corps of Engineers and a lot of what the Corps does, but it is predominately because of their Civil Works role, because that is the one that's more directly related to constituent programs, things that occur in their own districts and states. So I think Con-

gress takes a very active role in what the Corps of Engineers is doing on the Civil Works side and whoever the Chief of Engineers is going to be, how that Chief of Engineers may interact on the Civil Works side. There's always been the rumor that those relationships are much closer between Corps of Engineers personnel, both uniform and civilian, on the Civil Works side and Congress than on the Military Programs side.

The Military Programs side tended to be more directly related to just the ongoing daily in-and-outs of military operations, programs, facilities, installations, whatever. Congress certainly had a great interest but was not as actively or personally involved, I think, in some of the issues as they certainly were [about] whether the dams or levees or the water projects were going to occur or not occur.

MOORHUS: One of the other aspects of General Williams was that he had never served in the Pentagon and was not well known by the Army Staff, because he had had no connection with them.

LIVINGSTONE: Yes.

MOORHUS: So his selection was, in that sense, somewhat unexpected. It was an interesting situation.

LIVINGSTONE: Yes, I don't recall. As I said, I don't recall, before his selection, knowing him very well. He certainly was very pleasant and good to work with after his selection. I had not had much interaction with him at all. Pete Offringa had been in the Pentagon and was quite well known, and I just don't know what specifically they may or may not have been looking for at the time that would have caused them to make the differentiations in selections between the two individuals.

Again, those selections tend to also be made on career records, and I don't recall the career records of both individuals and how that may have played into the selection process. But again, as I said, I just didn't know Art that well for some of the reasons said, and I had had the opportunity to work very closely with Pete and stayed in touch with him after he left the Pentagon and moved on. I haven't for a couple of years, but we used to exchange Christmas cards up to the last couple of years.

Creation of ACSIM

MOORHUS: Can you talk about the creation of the ACS(IM), the Assistant Chief of Staff for Installation Management, because that was something that was a major accomplishment, I think, on your side but, from the Corps of Engineers, was a “mixed blessing.” Let’s put it that way.

LIVINGSTONE: I guess, from a philosophical point of view, my view was that the—and this was true of all the services, actually, not just the Army, but the installations themselves had taken kind of a back seat to many of the other programs in the Pentagon, as well they should. I mean the number one issue, of course, is the war fighting capability, and one can understand that. But the installations within the Department of the Army had fallen, as they normally do when budgets are tight, on hard times.

What I was hoping [was] that, because these [were] finite assets that were available, and particularly with base realignment and closure [BRAC] occurring, the installations themselves should and could be perceived as more than just sort of a bedding-down place or a temporary power projection platform from which one launched onto operations. They needed the care and feeding and attention to the future utilization of the training grounds—again, many of them were falling on hard times and losing some of their useful training purposes because of that lack of care and feeding that they deserved if the concept of installations [being] something of vast importance to the operational readiness of the Army could be recognized.

To do that, it was like the environmental program. You needed to raise Army installations up to a broader place, I guess, in perception, programming, and view, and not as just another program as we get to it or an adjunct that we deal with over on the side. I remember when I first came to the Army. I had a feeling, as they went around the table and they’d come to your program areas, sometimes as I’d raise my hand, the I,L&E were not deemed as sexy or as critical as some of the other program areas. Certainly I was not trying to say that they were of equal value, and certainly not in terms of mission importance to the Army, but again, they were critical to the performance of that mission and to the overall operational readiness and mission readiness of the Army. To change that, the Army needed to think about the I,L&E areas in a different way than they were before.

To do that, and that’s the approach we took with the Army Environmental Strategy, you had to embed these I,L&E programs as integral and critical

parts of the overall Army mission. I mean so we're not just talking about, "Here's our installation program. Here's our logistics program. Here's our environmental program." To the extent these programs are not embedded in or perceived critical to the Army's overall operational mission, they would be adjuncts. So our goal became everything that the Army did involved environmental considerations. The same with installations. The same with logistics. The goal was just trying to get these programs considered more holistically and not just as stand-alone programs.

In terms of installation management, the goal was to get the installations themselves to be integrated in the thought processes of Army readiness. Because of that goal, and I had no intent to take something of importance away from the Corps of Engineers, but when programs are not part of an embedded Army Staff function but rather in the major commands, they tended not to have the same resonance when you got into the Pentagon. So what I was attempting to do was to insure that these programs, in this case installation management, and also the training of installation management commanders, etc., had broader ownership, shall we say, within the Army Staff. So that's what the Assistant Chief of Staff for Army Installation Management [ACSIM] was intended to do.

I hope it's had that effect. I tracked this for awhile over time, a very dangerous thing to do in D.C., because everything you do tends to get reversed at some point down the road. But you have to remember that we're talking about an era in the Pentagon from November '89—the month that the Berlin Wall fell—to when I left, in January of 1993. Again, the timing to undertake this goal was propitious.

During that time, there was the so-called peace dividend. It was a time in which the Army was looking at new programs, new concepts, and new ways of doing business. They had the luxury to do that. They weren't focusing on fighting the Cold War as much. They were re-orienting to the future. The Chief of Staff of the Army at that time, [General] Gordon Sullivan, was very open and very prescient, in my thinking, in terms of the importance of dealing with these installation management, logistics, and environmental programs, other similar kinds of issues in terms of future Army—bill paying, operational readiness issues, whatever.

Today, we're dealing with the 9/11 environment, and as I read the fiscal '05 budgets, I notice some of the embeddedness has gone away, particularly in

the environmental arena. They're not speaking as much about environmental priorities. In terms of environment, they're talking predominately about restoration. As budget requirements and priorities change—particularly given GWOT [Global War on Terrorism] and Iraq—it's hard to keep the focus on such things as environmental programs without just constantly sort of pushing, priming the pump. That is totally understandable. And I may be wrong on that, because as I say, I'm doing this as an outsider and just following the budgets. I understand that they still have great environmental conferences and a lot of DOD [Department of Defense] activity going on, so I may be totally incorrect on this. But today—and as I said, understandably—it is difficult to perceive environmental priorities. It is too bad, as even now and even in Iraq, they exist and are issues which remain “pay now or pay later.”

I think these things are potentially and understandably cyclical. Right now, the Pentagon is focused on the 9/11 environment and on the Global War On Terrorism as they should be. There is probably not very much senior level time or attention that can be spent on dealing with some of these other areas like the environment or installation management and perhaps should not be. We've got a war going on in Iraq, at least post reconstruction portions of that, and so as different demands force different priorities on the institution, it's very difficult for programs like these to compete and maintain their position in the thought process of importance. But they still need care and feeding.

I'm not talking so much about resources here as I am just the perception of the importance of an installation in the Departments of the Army, Air Force, Navy, or Marines. What's being done today at these installations has implications for the future. What's being done today can impact on training readiness for the future through loss of training lands or environmental problems, whatever. Recognizing that time and attention to programs such as environmental stewardship can be cyclical, it just needs constant vigilance but within the common sense boundary of recognizing what the main priorities are of the institution which today, of course, is terrorism.

BRAC Cleanup

MOORHUS: You had responsibility for the BRAC process as well as for the environment. How did the two of those responsibilities work together or in opposition?

LIVINGSTONE: They actually worked quite well together. To me, there was sort of an irony about BRAC that forced a lot of environmental remediation and resourcing for that remediation that otherwise would have not been funded for years. Again, that was a congressional directive. I mean most communities—not all, but most communities—did not want those installations closed, and they fought hard, and when they finally got on the list to be closed, the whole mindset changed, which was, “Okay, we were not able to keep you here. Therefore, this is going to be now part of our community. We have to do something with it. We want you to clean it up fast. Move out fast. Let’s get it resolved fast so we can get this back into some kind of productive community use,” and that was very understandable.

Congress, as a result, got a lot of political pressure to fund environmental restoration, remediation, removal of ordnance, things of that nature. So there was an environmental good news that was almost an adjunct to the original intent, I think, of base realignment and closure, which was to reduce excess or underutilized facilities and lands.

That said, the cost of doing that always then competed with current environmental requirements, and that was—the Department of Defense did try to resolve that through different budget accounting, but you can only allocate so many resources to environmental programs, and so those competitions did occur. There was a huge amount that was going to be required to go into BRAC sites. Sometimes getting the sufficient funding to do some of the things you wanted to do for current sites was more difficult.

MOORHUS: Did you have any observations on the BRAC list that came out this year?

LIVINGSTONE: Not really. I don’t think I’ve gone over it in sufficient detail to even make a sufficiently intelligent comment about it. I mean there were some sites like Fort Monroe in Virginia that had been considered before, and because of various historical preservation issues and ordnance issues and re-utilization issues, we had not put that site on a prior closure list. But I left in 1993. We’re now 12 years later, and things change. Environments change, and so I assume that good process was used, and hopefully, these closures will be able to move forward. They’re getting to the tough sites, too. I mean sites that are going to require a huge amount of cleanup.

MOORHUS: Yes, I was wondering whether the fact that a site needs cleanup makes it more or less likely to be targeted for closure.

LIVINGSTONE: No. I don't know what the criteria were for the current BRAC. I assume the criteria were almost the same now as in the past, because it worked pretty well. There was a cost payback calculation that was required to be made, and in that, the estimated cost of environmental restoration was calculated. But if I recall correctly, it was sort of held over on the side. In other words, the issue was not, "Gee, we need to close this. We don't need this installation for our own use, but it's too darned expensive to clean up, so we can't afford to close it." That was never a consideration.

One of the examples of that would be Jefferson Proving Ground [JPG, Madison, Indiana]. Jefferson Proving Ground had an incredible amount of ordnance in it. It was on—I can't remember—the BRAC-I or BRAC-II List. I have not tracked it for a long time, but the sense was it was never going to be able to be cleaned up. It was just going to have to be fenced and protected and the public kept out. There was too much ordnance, and the cost of doing it was just astronomical.

MOORHUS: So then it would remain on the Army's roles?

LIVINGSTONE: It would remain in an unused category. It would be closed down. It would be mothballed, basically. It's closed, but there could possibly be some use. In some of these instances, you may get some very unique sharing arrangements with a park service or something of that nature in which there could be various wildlife programs or something going on. But in terms of Jefferson Proving Ground, I really don't know what's occurred to it.

It would be an interesting case to track, in a way, because it was something that was determined as not needed, but it was also something that was determined to be an astronomically expensive environmental remediation. That said, and I probably misspoke when I said it was going to be mothballed, there was a commitment to start cleaning it up, but it was going to be a very, very lengthy process because of the amount of money that was going to be required to do it, and it was going to take a very, very long time.

MOORHUS: Has the BRAC process itself encouraged the Army to be more sensitive and caring about the way they use their installations?

LIVINGSTONE: I hope so. I think certainly it was a very educational lesson learned in terms of what the costs are of past practices. It's sort of a pay-me-now or pay-me-later situation, and I think that BRAC helped highlight that and underscore the costs of certain types of decisions and the importance of calculating those costs, not just current, but also future, into military decision-making.

That is one of the reasons, for instance, that the disposal of conventional ammunition—the disposal costs of conventional ammunition—are supposed to be calculated into the current procurement acquisition costs of conventional ammunition. Of course, whether they actually do that or not, or whether those disposal costs are calculated but not heeded in decision-making, are two different things.

But it wasn't just BRAC. I mean you have to recognize the whole emphasis on environmental issues changed dramatically in the '70s, '80s, and '90s. The regulations changed. The compliance requirements changed. The Endangered Species Act was enacted. I mean everything changed in terms of the impact on military operations, and while there were some exemptions or some differences that were made at times in terms of military operations, I think it all came together to highlight that there is a future cost embedded into today's decisions, and those can fall into a number of areas, not the least of which might be environmental remediation later on.

Army Communities of Excellence

MOORHUS: Did you get involved with installations overseas and environmental issues overseas?

LIVINGSTONE: Yes. I was just thinking about that earlier today. There have certainly been some training land degradation issues in Hohenfels [Germany] and other places. I'd been over there. I'd seen them and certainly been involved in some of the Chem Demil [chemical demilitarization] issues as we were moving the munitions out of Germany to come back to Johnston Island [Pacific Ocean Atoll], but it was probably to a lesser extent. They certainly were covered by the same Army policies, strategies, and requirements.

In many cases, the host countries also had environmental requirements that had to be met that were in addition to or even sometimes more stringent, perhaps, than we imposed. So it was a combination more of oversight, policy, and strategy than it was traveling overseas as much as I did to some of the domestic installations.

MOORHUS: Did you do a lot of traveling?

LIVINGSTONE: Not as much as I probably should have. I did travel, and I went to a number of different places. I didn't seek to travel. There was plenty to do back in the Pentagon, and so I guess what I did was travel when there seemed to be a good purpose, a good reason, or a fruitful reason to do so, but I didn't really seek out opportunities to visit every installation while I was in the job or something of that nature. So I saw those places I could when I was out doing whatever job I needed to be doing.

MOORHUS: One of the new programs established in Fiscal Year '89 was the Army's Communities of Excellence. I think that was an initiative of General Vuono, perhaps, the predecessor for Gordon Sullivan?

LIVINGSTONE: I think you might be right on that. I remember participating in handing out some of the checks and things of that nature. Award recognitions are good, and particularly award recognitions that provide money are good. In this particular case, if I recall correctly, those checks could be utilized for pretty much anything at the installation. I don't recall if they were even required to be put back into community programs. They probably were, but there was, as I recall, a lot of latitude for the installations in terms of utilization of those funds. So there was quite a deal of competition, and people were pleased when they got the recognition and won.

MOORHUS: It seems to fit in with the idea of raising consciousness about installations.

LIVINGSTONE: Yes. Well, there was a whole bunch of confluence of events there. With all the environmental awareness growing in this country and changing over time, by the time I hit the Army, the Army had a lot of great programs in place already and was doing very good things. There was also a growing emphasis on quality of life at Army installations. The part that was missing was—and I think I used the word before—

“embeddedness” of those programs and the integration of them in terms of the Army mission. It’s very difficult when you have initiatives that are important, but they have no—well, I won’t say “home,” but when they’re just sort of stand-alone programs, because depending on personalities, interest, and one thing or another, they can wax or wane, or then can gain more attention or lose attention over time.

What you want to do is get these programs so that they are so embedded that, no matter who’s there or what gets done, people are thinking about them. They are part of the rules. They are in the regulations. If you’re buying a weapons system, you have to think about it. If you are training, you have to think about it. If you’re a logistician out there doing inventory management, you’re thinking about it. If you’re Sparky out there, working on the Humvee and putting the oil in, you’re thinking about it. So that was our area of emphasis for the years I was there and hopefully that continued after, and certainly some aspects of this need for “embeddedness” were initiated before I was there.

So trying to take these programs and really [putting] them into an operational context for the Army was the key. Again, when your mission is war fighting, if the program or the initiative or the issue of importance has no bearing or value added to that overall mission, it’s not going to fare well. So you either have to demonstrate that it does, and not just with a bunch of verbiage—I mean hard facts, cost figures, and one thing or another—or you’re not going to be successful in furthering the issue.

Domestic Disaster Relief Operations

MOORHUS: You were also involved with domestic disaster relief, in particular the *Exxon Valdez*, which I think was before you actually came into office.

LIVINGSTONE: Yes.

MOORHUS: And in the fall—I think it might have been about the same time, maybe a little bit earlier—the Loma Prieta Earthquake [California, 1989].

LIVINGSTONE: Somewhat. The disaster relief fell under the Director of Military Support Programs area. DOMS is what they called it, and DOMS fell under the oversight of I,L&E. Military support is triggered in times of

national domestic disaster. When the Loma Prieta occurred, we did provide assistance, but the ones that I was more involved in, in terms of actually traveling down to the site, [were] Hurricane Andrew [South Florida, August 24, 1992] and then Hurricane Iniki [Hawaii, September 11, 1992].

MOORHUS: What do you remember about those experiences?

LIVINGSTONE: On Hurricane Andrew, probably three distinct memories. The first distinct memory was the great interest within the Department of Defense of immediately assisting when that occurred and not being able to do so without some degree of activation by the state of Florida. That's when the state was trying to decide whether they would just rely on the National Guard or whether they wanted to ask for federal disaster assistance.

In those kinds of situations, we were hearing from our folks on the ground already about the damage that had occurred and that this was very, very serious and needed to have a very rapid reaction. There was a time there where there was a flurry of calls going back and forth, and I was among them, to various places trying to get decisions on being able to get the decision on activation of military resources so we could go down there, and ultimately, that was done. The military responded very quickly and very well.

The other thing is I went down there, and so the second distinct memory was just the incredible devastation. It was absolutely remarkable to fly over acre after acre after acre of areas that had been basically flattened. You see it in war zones, but this was Florida, and it was really quite remarkable. Then the third memory I'll always carry with me, when I was on the ground, walking around, talking to our folks, and watching them, was the incredible gratitude for the help that people were receiving in the basics of water, food, and things of that nature. So it was very heartwarming to see that aspect of what the United States military can do for its country beyond its national defense.

In terms of Hurricane Iniki, I was sent out there because we were, at that time, setting up a whole coordination of—in fact, Elizabeth Dole [American Red Cross President 1991-1999] was out there at the same time—the American Red Cross, the Department of Defense, our military support, the governor [John Waihee] and the political structure of Hawaii—we had a

big meeting in terms of roles and responsibilities and things that needed to be done.

Then I went over to Kauai to meet with the mayor there and folks on the ground and discussed with them our initial help that we had brought there, how that was working, and what more needed to be done or not be done. Again, our help was incredibly, gratefully received. [It was] a remarkable, quick recovery given the amount of damage that was done over there. But both of my trips were very, very brief. I didn't spend long periods of time there but just really over and back for these kinds of meetings or to see what needed to be done.

MOORHUS: One of the things that Dee Walker talked about, on a couple of different occasions, was getting called at home, being awakened in the night when there was some emergency. Did you get calls like that?

LIVINGSTONE: Some. I mean it was not frequent, but they predominately came in the ChemDemil program. If a problem was occurring at our plant on Johnston Island after it went hot, and if we had to have a shutdown, or there was an issue, or whatever, I would get called. I would get calls from the Army Operations Center fairly frequently if something was happening that I needed to zippity-do-dah in at 4:00 o'clock in the morning or 5:00 o'clock in the morning and go to the Operations Center, so you get those kinds of calls.

I welcomed them. I encouraged them to be made, because I wanted to be there. I wanted to participate in that sort of way, and I think it was probably something that, unless you had a specific role, you weren't necessarily going to get a call unless they knew that you wanted to come and participate or be there. So the Army Operations did most of those quick calls around. I think it was partly in response to what your assigned responsibilities were and whether you needed to be there, and secondly, what kind of signal or interest you'd expressed in being there and participating as well.

Army Environmental Policy Institute

MOORHUS: What do you remember about the Army Environmental Policy Institute?

LIVINGSTONE: It was set up [laughter]. I can't remember the year, to tell you the truth. They turned out a lot of good documents and educational materials to help further this whole issue of embeddedness within the Department of the Army. I believe they were the ones, but I'm not sure, that earlier on had sent out environmental success stories and a booklet on those as well.

One of the things that kind of ticked me off, and still ticks me off in some respects, is the Department of Defense gets a huge bad rap for their environmental pollution and degradation of lands and one thing and another, and yes, lobbing bombs and shells and grenades and things into areas is not particularly environmentally friendly. I recognize that, and yes, training and maneuvers are not particularly environmentally friendly. But by and large over the years, I mean the sustainment of a lot of these areas and lands has been taken rather seriously by the military services in restorations of them, berming, protection, and wildlife refuges set aside.

So in many respects, the ultimate irony is, a lot of these areas that the public may have horrific things to say about are, in some aspects, some of the best wildlife habitat you're going to have today, because it's been protected from developers and not been subject to local political buyouts on zoning or one thing and another. So I think it's important the services get credit where credit's due.

I recognized the Army had a lot of challenges, but they were also doing a lot of good. Early on, there was an interview I gave. I think it was in response to an article that came out, and it was sort of this glass half empty, half full deal and whether or not we should speak about 1,000 points of light versus 1,000 points of blight. I thought it was important that we got the word out that, "We've got a lot of work, a lot of challenges and stuff we need to do, but hey folks, we're doing a lot of great stuff, too, so let's recognize that as well."

Summary Thoughts on Army Environmental Work

MOORHUS: Tell me about the Environmental Leadership Conference.

LIVINGSTONE: Oh. Well, [it was] held for exactly the purpose the title says, and probably today, a lot of these things are being done more by teleconferences or whatever. But it was very important to get people together that were working in common cause, so to speak, and have them share les-

sons learned, challenges, issues, success stories, and whatever. I felt they could use “atta-boy” “atta-girl” recognitions and have some senior leaders come down and speak to them and let them know that people did care, that they were watching, and talk about new policies, gain their insights and get their inputs of what’s working, what’s not working, or if some policy we’ve promulgated is stupid and needs to be revised—or is there an area that needs to be changed?

I remember we also used to get people off the Hill, for instance—was he even a senator then?—George Allen. Anyway, we always tried to get somebody from the Hill to speak as well at these conferences and just give recognition to these folks and let them know that people were paying attention on the Hill, not only just in the Pentagon. We also invited speakers and attendees from other government agencies and also the other services—the Department of Defense slowly but surely is becoming a bit more [purple] and joint in their approaches to things, and that’s good.

So to the extent that these kinds of leadership development, leadership seminar, leadership conferences can be at least, in part, held joint, with perhaps breakouts on service-specific issues, I’m all for it. I think it’s good.

MOORHUS: That reminds me of the environment being managed at the Department of Defense level, and there was a woman named [Deputy Undersecretary for Environmental Security] Sherry Goodman [there] about the same time, or that might have been after you left.

LIVINGSTONE: Yes.

MOORHUS: Was there an environmental person?

LIVINGSTONE: Yes, Tom Baca, I think. Tom Baca. The Department of Defense focused very significantly on environmental issues associated with the BRAC properties. They wanted to track that, and they wanted to track what the overall cost was going to be current and future, because these were ongoing bills. I mean if you committed to a six-year payback, and you needed to address environmental problems, could you do it within that period of time? Could you get the land turned over to whatever re-utilization was going to occur within that time, and what was going to be the cost of it?

So you had those issues that were tracked at the OSD level, and then there was also encouragement and direction. I don't recall a really significant effort for a Department of Defense level joint environmental strategy at the time. It may have been there, but as the services themselves were just in the nascent period of doing their own, I recall more that OSD strongly encouraged our initiatives. There was certainly strong OSD oversight on the funding areas. [There were] very detailed OSD reviews and inputs on the BRAC environmental side, and I believe there were some Defense environmental conferences, awards, and things of that nature as well, but beyond that, that's really the highlights of the OSD role I recall, from my time at least.

MOORHUS: Did you have any contact with anyone comparable to your position on the Navy or the Air Force side?

LIVINGSTONE: We did, but it was mostly within the joint arenas like BRAC where those of us who were dealing with BRAC in our particular services would come together. Then we would deal with joint issues like environment or cost paybacks or re-utilization challenges. Or sometimes other services wanted to have a piece of the property you were going to be giving up. Or trying to integrate areas in which the two services both have to have a maintenance depot doing X. Could there be one maintenance depot that would do X for all the services?

Those forums did exist very strongly, and they were under the leadership predominately of a fellow by the name of David Berteau. He worked for a fellow who's now passed away, Colin McMillan, who was the assistant secretary. David was a very, very proactive deputy, and I have a very high regard for him.

MOORHUS: Were you involved with any of the lawsuits on the environment while you were there?

LIVINGSTONE: I'm sure I am and was, and the reason I'm hesitating on that, I'm going to laugh, because when I came up for Navy confirmation—well, we'll get to that in a moment. The answer is yes, but I couldn't even quote one case to you. The only reason I know is that, when I filled out my security clearance forms to be considered for Undersecretary of the Navy, there's a section in there about, "Are you under any civil litigation?" or whatever, and I said no.

So they came back and said, “Well, actually, you’re listed in this lawsuit,” and I think it was for Seneca Army Depot [Seneca County, New York] on the closure of Seneca. To tell you the truth, I think I was named after I left or before my successor was, and I know nothing of what happened in the suit or if I was named in any others. That’s the only reason I know my name’s probably on some suits.

MOORHUS: That’s interesting.

LIVINGSTONE: Yes. I had to convince the FBI I really wasn’t lying.

3 Working in the Red Cross

MOORHUS: After you left in '93, your next position is at the American Red Cross?

LIVINGSTONE: Yes.

MOORHUS: Is there something you can cite from your experience as the assistant secretary that you carried over with you to the Red Cross?

LIVINGSTONE: I'm trying to think how—that's always a hard issue when you talk about two such distinctly different types of organizational entities. From a personal point of view, and I always laughed at myself on this, to me, it was a very great lesson in humility to go to work for the American Red Cross, because after you've had this stint in the Pentagon, and you've got all these people working these issues, and [you've] got support groups, and papers are done, and you ask about some analytical research, and there are people who have the access to do it and whatever—when I showed up to work on my first day at the American Red Cross, I realized those days were gone. I was in my office by myself, and nobody even showed up the whole first day.

I finally wandered upstairs in this old building, and I said, "I'm the new Vice President of Health and Safety Services. They said, "Oh, yes, we heard you were here," and from then on out, it became very clear to me that there was an entirely different orientation to this organization, that you had absolutely no position there like you may have statutorily, which is written in the statute of the Department of Defense, and that if I've forgotten how to wash windows, I was going to learn how to do them again, because if you didn't do it, it didn't get done.

So when I was hiring people later for the Red Cross, and particularly if they had worked in a federal agency, I told them, "If you don't like to wash windows"—and I used that exact term—"don't come to work here. If you feel like you've progressed to some place in your professional development that you're not willing to sit down and slug it out again, then you won't be happy here." For me, it was a very good personal lesson, not only in humility, but also in regaining some basic skills I'd lost. Just things that you had

started relying on other people to do, and it also forced me, oddly enough in 1993, to have to learn how to use my own computer.

I had very strong support staff help at the Pentagon and the ethos was that people worked long hours. If I wanted to work late—and few worked late at the Red Cross; they all went home at 5:30 or 6:00—so if I wanted to work until 8:00 or later at night, and I needed to type something up, I had to learn to do it myself. I needed to know where the lights were, how the printer worked, how the fax machine worked, how to do the computer, everything. So it was a good lesson in remembering the basics and not forgetting how to do the basic stuff that's good to know and important to know how to do.

In terms of organizational stuff, I suppose nothing particular comes to mind other than the experience that you always get in any organization which is learning how to deal with different people and they with you. So certainly, those kinds of lessons carry forward from job to job as you hopefully grow in insight and common sense a little bit, so that would be some carryover. Then there was also the mission orientation to it.

What attracted me to the Red Cross was, again, that it was something that was sort of a truth, justice, and American way kind of mission, and so that was good. I missed working in the military environment, but obviously, with the change in administrations, that wasn't an option, and I did miss it. So, it was good to have some degree of continuity into an organization like the Red Cross that was also doing things that were good and worthwhile.

MOORHUS: So you were there roughly five years, and then you went to—

LIVINGSTONE: From '93 to—

MOORHUS: '98?

LIVINGSTONE: '97, '98—well, in '97 and '98, I did some consultancy for the Armed Forces Emergency Services, yes, in '98.

MOORHUS: And then you went to AUSA [Association of the United States Army].

LIVINGSTONE: Yes, but that was not a paid job. That was when I became CEO.

MOORHUS: And that's not a paid job?

LIVINGSTONE: Not at all. That was volunteer.

MOORHUS: Interesting. Then you went to the Navy.

LIVINGSTONE: Yes.

MOORHUS: July of 2001.

LIVINGSTONE: Yes.

4 Working in the Navy

MOORHUS: So how would you compare and contrast working for the Army and the Navy?

LIVINGSTONE: I don't know if I want this on the record or not [laughter]. Let me just keep it fairly basic. I think I told you this before, Donita. My favorite job was in the Department of the Army, and it was probably for a whole bunch of different reasons. It may have been where I was at that time in my life and where it was the right time, the right place, the right organization, and the right people. Everything kind of came together, and it was just a good mesh at the time.

The Department of the Navy does not have the same formal assurances for interactions with their civilian leadership that the Army has. So it's a much more difficult transition, shall we say. I remember talking to [General] Jack Keane, who was the Army Vice Chief of Staff at the time, and he said, "Oh, Susan, you're going to be working in the Navy now, and it's going to be great to have you in the Building. I just sat down and talked to our entire Army staff about the new team coming in and how we needed to work closely with them and remember all of these things, etc.," and I said, "Well, Jack, I sure wish that had happened in the Department of the Navy," [laughter]. It was just a different culture. It was just an entirely different culture.

There were not the same shared meetings. There were not the same shared anythings, nothing formal, so all of that had to be devised and worked out, and apparently, it is worked out with each new civilian leadership team that comes in, whatever works for them, and then that ends. Then the next team comes in, and they may form four other groups that do something, but there's no continuity of formal organizational interactions that the Army has. So that just made it very challenging, I think.

It's also interesting having the dynamic of two services, and both of them have a great deal of commonality with each other, the Navy and the Marine Corps, but also some very distinct differences between them as well, so that was probably a bit more challenging as well. They also were not as much, I guess, into—well, I hate to say this, but the Army is an overly-

documented organization, and they're very heavy into their documentation. In many respects, this is great stuff, I mean in terms of preserving history and whatever. The Navy is not as much so, and the Marine Corps is a little bit more like the Army but not as much as the Army. So it was difficult even to find things to read up on to get prepared on how this is all going to work.

For instance, the Army, when I first came on board, had a book that was about 300 or 400 pages or something, *How The Army Works*. I mean it was just 101 how everything works, what all the people did, [what] various activities and programs were, whatever. There was no comparable document for the Department of the Navy, or at least that I was able to find, so it was much more difficult to even get some initial baseline information and sort of 101 information, except through multiple briefings.

Then, of course, it was an entirely different environment at that time. I came in, and just very shortly, weeks after, we had September 11th, so the whole dynamic of the organization changed. It was a very difficult time for the services and for DOD. On top of the already transformational programs that were being undertaken, you had the response to the war on terrorism. So, it was just a different time and place.

MOORHUS: Did you have security protection?

LIVINGSTONE: Not full time, no. On some installations when I was out, they would provide security protection. Occasionally, I would be put up in some remote base cottage some place, and people might be outside just insuring—but really very minimal protection.

MOORHUS: Were there differences in the way you were treated as a woman in the two cultures?

LIVINGSTONE: [Pause]. The answer is no, and the only reason I'm hesitating is that there was a difference in the way I was treated, but I don't think it was because I was a woman. This may go back to, again, the fact that there are not any of these trained, built-in, formal relational guidelines in the uniform Navy and uniform Marine Corps on roles, responsibilities, and required interactions with civilian types like myself as there [were] in the Army. At the Army, there were a number of formal civilian and senior leadership forums and meetings. Now, of course, if you violated

one, I mean showed up at a meeting where [you] were weren't a formal player, that would throw them off completely, and I did that very early on in the Department of the Army, because—I think I told you this in the first interview—I went home one night, after making some budget input. I got back the next morning at 7:30 or 8:00, or whenever it was, and they'd overturned it. I had not left until about 7:30 or 8:00, so I thought, "Okay, when did that happen?" Well, that's when I discovered there was this little group called the Council of Colonels that apparently meets very late at night. So I showed up the next night at the Council of Colonels, and it was very uncomfortable for them, because they are fairly protocol-bound. I did not mean it to be uncomfortable. I was just trying to figure out—I'd never worked in a military environment—who these people were and how this process worked.

Anyway, the good side from that is that, henceforth from then, I got more information that was very helpful. I let them know I really did want to play, and if they didn't want me slugging it around with them at midnight, then they're going to have to make sure I got the information another way.

5 Closing Remarks

MOORHUS: Having worked for both the Army and the Navy, do you, on some abstract intellectual level, have an interest in working for the Air Force as well?

LIVINGSTONE: No, and nothing negative about the Air Force. My dad was career Air Force, so I was raised in an Air Force family until 1968. So on some level, I have a chance to work or experience all the service areas I've lived or worked in all of them.

MOORHUS: Okay.

LIVINGSTONE: The other difference I was thinking about between the Army and the Navy, too, is my whole work instincts are very much of the hands-on kind of line manager type. That probably becomes more difficult to do and probably more difficult for some people to deal with, particularly as you get into higher level positions, because they're not used to you being as involved, and I certainly appreciate that. I mean I understand why that would cause some consternation in some areas. It's just I tended to always get very into the detail in trying to understand how things really worked and enjoyed [it].

In my Department of the Army, Assistant Secretary (I,L&E) job there were line management kinds of hands-on things that you could do with the Army Staff. As Undersecretary of the Navy, it was much more of a broader oversight, and so that was a much different role than any other job I'd ever had before.

MOORHUS: One of the comments I heard about your time with the Army was that you read Environmental Impact Statements.

LIVINGSTONE: I edited them, which is even worse.

MOORHUS: But this is reported with satisfaction, with amazement that you were that interested. It was not a negative comment.

LIVINGSTONE: Well, that's good to hear.

MOORHUS: So you remember that.

LIVINGSTONE: Yes. I'm a copious reader. But that's why I told you I do data dumps. I cannot retain—it's like my NASA job right now. People send me massive amounts of information, because they know I'll read it. That's the way I learn, and that's the way my brain computes and processes. You weed out the wheat and the chaff, and somehow, it just all comes together. However, I can't retain all that data and detail. So as soon as this NASA job's over, I will have to data dump that so I can clear out the old cobwebs and make brain room to start something else.

I also can't just pick up something and sign it without reading it, and I understand the absurdity of that, given the volume of paper that comes to you in Pentagon jobs for signature approval, except I can read very fast. I'm not going line by line and taking it home and reading 14 hours on an Environmental Impact Statement. But I can thumb through quickly on things, and as I go through, hit and just pick out the areas that are important. Sometimes, you pick up very significant inconsistencies or issues that you don't want there, so it was just a bad habit I started when I first started to work when I was a kid, and I kept doing it until I retired.

MOORHUS: Not necessarily a bad habit.

LIVINGSTONE: Well, it drove some people nuts.

MOORHUS: That's a different thing [laughter]. Okay I don't know that I have any other questions, but do you have anything else that you would like to add to all of this?

LIVINGSTONE: No. I do have some things out on the dining room table, Donita, if you want to go through and see if there's anything of interest. Some of the stuff I think I'm just willing to let you have if you want it.

MOORHUS: Okay.

LIVINGSTONE: They're just copies of stuff that I have, and at this point in my career, I probably don't really need to retain them.

MOORHUS: Okay.

LIVINGSTONE: There are a few that I would keep. I also have some scrapbooks from my Army time, but I've only been able to locate a couple of those, but you're welcome to look at those to see if you want to take selected pages or take the scrapbooks. So we can turn this off, and you can look.

MOORHUS: Okay. Thank you.

[End of interview]

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